Liberty and moral ambivalence: Postsocialist transitions, refugee hosting, and bodily comportment in the Republic of Guinea by Mcgovern, Mike
MIKE MCGOVERN
University of Michigan
Liberty and moral ambivalence:
Postsocialist transitions, refugee hosting, and bodily
comportment in the Republic of Guinea
A B S T R A C T
Guinean hosts viewed Liberian refugees with the
same ambivalence and fascination that many held
for their own children, who were embracing the
consumerist ethos of Guinea’s postsocialist 1990s.
Loma-speaking farmers’ categories for evaluating
historical change and refugee comportment grew
out of metaphors of embodied agency and morality.
These categories challenge some aspects of both
Guinean elites’ and contemporary anthropologists’
understandings of the meaning of post–Cold War
social change. [subaltern historiography,
embodiment, Guinea, West Africa, fast capitalism,
postsocialism]
O
n December 22, 2008, Guinean president Lansana Conte´ died,
ending almost 25 years in office. Conte´’s rule had begun in
a coup d’e´tat following the death in office of Guinea’s first
postcolonial leader, Se´kou Toure´. Similarly, on the morning af-
ter Conte´’s death, a military junta took over, headed by Cap-
tain Moussa Dadis Camara, a fiery and loquacious junior officer. Many
Guineans welcomed the power grab by the junta, in part because the con-
stitutionally mandated interim leader, president of the National Assem-
bly Aboubacar Sompare´, was widely disliked and mistrusted. Sompare´ was
the symbol of a system that Guineans almost universally considered dys-
functional and morally repugnant. In Conakry on a research sabbatical
during 2008 and 2009, I challenged many of my Guinean friends about
the takeover, asking, “How can you support this coup, when the outgoing
regime you hate so much began in exactly the same way?”
Their responses varied, but many came back to Camara’s promises to
reinject morality into the Guinean public sphere and the management of
the state. In an interview he gave two days after seizing power, Camara
said, “I could not, as a patriot, watch my country continue to get dragged
down . . . . It would also have been irresponsible to leave the country in
the hands of a government that was corrupt and moreover riven by inter-
nal quarrels.” He described himself as “allergic to injustice,” claiming, “I
react spontaneously to combat it. Everyone who knows me knows that I
always speak the truth, even if I have to suffer the consequences. I hate
lies, hypocrisy, and ingratitude” (Seck 2009). Still, I pressed, talk was cheap,
and this was the rhetoric of every junior-ranks coup, words betrayed by
actions in the vast majority of such takeovers in Guinea and around the
world. Many Guineans noted their own misgivings along these lines but
also reminded me that Camara came from one of the small ethnic groups
of Guinea’s forest region, where I had lived on-and-off for 20 years and con-
ducted my Ph.D. research. “You know that Dadis is a Forestier,” one col-
league said. “So, his ‘yes’ is yes, and his ‘no’ is no,” she continued, quoting
a positive stereotype that many Forestiers use to describe themselves and
that was once considered accurate by other Guineans too.1
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In fact, Camara turned out to be increasingly erratic
and unwilling to cede power, and he presided over an
ugly one-year interregnum of economic pillage and vio-
lence that culminated in the massacre or rape of over 200
unarmed demonstrators trapped by security forces inside
a football stadium. His behavior did much to shatter the
positive stereotype of Forestier honesty and reliability, but
it opens a window onto the subject of this article: the lived
complexities of moral ambivalence I recorded a decade
earlier in the forest region where Camara was raised.
To explain that ambivalence, I first give a broad
overview of several of the significant and simultaneous
changes that contributed to the rise of a distinctive form
of fast capitalism in Guinea in the 1990s. Fast capitalism
is a term used both by Michael Watts (1992) and Douglas
Holmes (2000), with a debt to David Harvey (1991). It has
an analytical advantage over the blanket term neoliberal-
ism, often used by anthropologists, in that it focuses on the
experience of the acceleration of change. Guinean farm-
ers identified the changes of the 1990s as neither new nor
liberal but as a return to an earlier, precolonial, political-
economic configuration. What was most disturbing about
this shift was its speed, unpredictability, and the sense that
its momentum might result in major imbalances. Guineans
in the 1990s had to learn on the fly how to manage new cir-
cuits shaping the flows of information, capital, consumer
goods, and styles. The experience of such rapid change cre-
ated confusion, frustration, and considerable anxiety. These
worries are captured by the term fast capitalism.
In the second part of this article, I present the interre-
lated Loma concepts of booyema and ziiεlei to refract these
changes. While the terms carry the broad connotations of
“liberty” and “security,” respectively, both derive from con-
ceptions of embodied morality, agency, and causality, with
booyema meaning literally “by the agency of my arm or
hand” and ziiεlei meaning “cool heart.” As Loma-speaking
farmers use these terms to describe the differences between
historical periods, they make it clear that increased scope
for individual gain, identified as booyema, has often come
at the expense of the ziiεlei, or security, of the majority.
The two tendencies exist in an inverse relation, according to
Loma speakers talking about historical change. Their ratios
have oscillated over time, from the perilous but lucrative pe-
riod of intervillage slave raiding in the late 19th century to
the oppressive but peaceful colonial and socialist periods
and then to the newly dangerous and unpredictable period
of postsocialist change and regional war in the 1990s.
The third part of my discussion explores how anxi-
eties and disagreements about the moral valences of dif-
ferent embodied enactments of liberty became crystallized
in the figure of the Liberian refugee resident in Guinea.
The Liberians were themselves victims of the untrammeled
greed, ruthlessness, and booyema of Charles Taylor and the
other warlords who fought the Liberian civil war. At the
time of this conflict, Guineans were debating the proper
balance of booyema and ziiεlei in the context of the rapid
changes taking place in their own country after the end of
socialism. Refugees thus offered a convenient foil but were
also catalysts in Guineans’ conversations about the moral-
ity of liberty, especially in matters of bodily comportment,
dress, sexual and marital conduct, commercial practices,
and even eating and defecating. The proper balance be-
tween entrepreneurial energy and security, whose contours
had become frustratingly hard to define in Guinea, could
be more easily discussed by focusing on the comportment
of refugees. Debates about foreigners and about Guineans
themselves were interlinked in complex ways.2 The discus-
sion of booyema, ziiεlei, and the figure of the refugee sheds
light on the moral calculus Guineans used to evaluate both
historical change and individual comportment and hints
at their theories of how the two were interrelated. Refugee
comportment became a prism for parallel debates about
the positive and negative aspects of the socioeconomic
changes that had accompanied the postsocialist era. These
discussions surrounding moral ambivalence also help to ex-
plain why so many Guineans warmed to the 2008 junta,
whose moralistic rhetoric channeled some aspects of the
Se´kou Toure´–era socialist ethos, even if it sidestepped the
politics of pan-Africanism and postcolonial nationalism.
By bringing together these seemingly unrelated str-
ands, I contribute to the conversation about rapid social
change in African countries that have been subjected to the
package of legal, financial, and political policies most of-
ten glossed as “neoliberalism.”3 The material from Guinea
suggests several general contributions to this conversation.
Disaggregating the series of simultaneous changes going on
alongside the political-economic reforms that began with
structural adjustment allows us to see that ordinary peo-
ple’s greatest attention and energy were focused not at the
direct or even indirect effects of such political-economic
shifts but, rather, at embodied comportments that have an
autonomous history and trajectory of their own. The end
of socialism marked the end of many hated restrictions on
Guineans’ everyday lives, and the fantasy of full participa-
tion in a consumerist form of cosmopolitanism was power-
ful and seductive. At the same time, many Loma-speaking
villagers quickly discerned the links between the power-
ful desire for things and the potentially violent forces of
booyema used to get them. Attraction and critique are thus
intertwined in the concepts of booyema and ziiεlei and ac-
company a considerable degree of anxiety that if the bal-
ance between “liberty” and “security” gets badly out of
kilter, the result could be violent antisocial disruption.
Following from this point, if we choose to read farm-
ers’ concerns with propriety as a genuine disagreement
with intellectuals’ models of cultural causality (and not as a
misrecognition of their own situation), the Loma-language
conceptions of booyema and ziiεlei allow us to see that this
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disagreement has a history. Because Loma-speaking farm-
ers’ use of these terms in narrating history presents a dis-
sident historiography of their nation, we are faced with a
stark possibility. The contemporary academic understand-
ing of the relations between political economy and cultural
phenomena may be out of sync with that of Loma-speaking
organic intellectuals (Feierman 1990). Moreover, it may be
out of sync in the same ways and for the same reasons that
Loma-speakers disagree with Guinean elites about the re-
ceived nationalist historiography of their country.
A concatenation of factors driving change
The 1990s were years of rapid change in Guinea. The rea-
sons for this rapidity were multiple, and it is worth teasing
them apart for explanatory clarity, although they emerged
simultaneously.4 One was a shift from a state-controlled so-
cialist economy with an ethos of egalitarianism and a rather
Spartan morality to a capitalist economy shaped partly by
World Bank, IMF, and donor demands and a morally and
politically laissez-faire state posture. A second was a shift
from a relatively closed society with a strong sense of na-
tional unity and historical exceptionalism to one that was
more open to outside cultural influences.
Under socialist president Se´kou Toure´ (1958–84),
Guinea had been sealed off from the rest of the world
in a variety of ways. It was illegal to trade one’s agricul-
tural produce or livestock over the borders, even where
those borders and neighboring market towns were far closer
than Guinean markets.5 Roads leading toward Guinea’s
six neighbors turned near impassable some one hundred
kilometers from the borders. The Guinean currency, the syli,
was nonconvertible outside the country, and it was illegal
either to carry syli outside or to have foreign currency in-
side Guinea. Politically, the country oscillated between a
nonaligned stance (accepting aid projects from China, the
USSR, Cuba, and Vietnam but also Germany and the United
States) and rejectionist, several times expelling all whites
except for a few missionaries personally known by Toure´.
Although Toure´ was ideologically a pillar of pan-Africanism,
in practice, he expelled many of the West Africans living
and doing business in the country (Diawara 1998), and he
carried on decades-long grudge matches with neighboring
Coˆte d’Ivoire and Senegal that several times almost led to
war. The Guinean government also asserted its prerogative
to seal its borders culturally. In the southeastern rainfor-
est region where I conduct research (known as the Re´gion
Forestie`re), initiations into men’s and women’s societies
were made illegal soon after independence. Individuals and
cohorts of adolescents who went into neighboring Liberia
or Sierra Leone to take care of their ritual business with ex-
tended kin were regularly met with beating and imprison-
ment by the Guinean police when they returned.
Not surprisingly, many Guineans broke these prohibi-
tions, and even more “voted with their feet,” so that, at the
time of Toure´’s death in office in 1984, the internal popu-
lation of the country was four million, while two million
other Guineans were registered as residents in the six neigh-
boring countries (Bah et al. 1989). Yet the example of new
initiates being arrested upon their return to the country is
germane: The Guinean government worked hard to impose
itself on all its citizens, all of the time, through a coherent
if sometimes oppressive standard of proper national com-
portment. In schools, girls were examined by nurses at the
beginning of each academic year to verify that they were
still virgins. If not, they were publicly shamed and forced
to reveal the names of their lovers. This practice, called “la
visite,” was justified as necessary to boost the number of
girls who would advance through the educational system
and was combined with affirmative action policies for the
acceptance of female students into high school and uni-
versity. The one-party state’s youth wing, La Jeunesse de
la Re´volution De´mocratique Africaine (JRDA), was tasked
with policing morality, and women or girls wearing skirts
deemed too short could be publicly punished, fined, or ar-
rested (Straker 2009; cf. Ivaska 2011 for similar campaigns in
socialist Tanzania). Long hair on men and extravagant hair
designs for women were also punishable offenses.6 This sort
of policing of personal comportment was one of the char-
acteristic projects of a state that sought to impose its moral
vision on its citizens. It became a central aspect of the lived
reality of Guinean socialism.
After Toure´’s 1984 death, which ended 26 years of rule,
Colonel Lansana Conte´ took power in a coup d’e´tat. Conte´,
by his own reckoning, was neither an ideologue nor an
intellectual.7 He was a practical man and promised to cede
to Guineans a large share of the freedoms they had lost
under the socialist government. This hands-off approach
to governance was congruent with the prevailing mantras
of neoliberal economists, and Conte´ was immediately vis-
ited by missions from the World Bank and the IMF, who
convinced him that he should liberalize the economy and
institute major structural changes in the way the state
ran its affairs (Azarya and Chazan 1987; Campbell 1998;
Campbell and Clapp 1995). In the years immediately af-
ter he took power, Conte´ closed nearly every small indus-
trial plant in the country. Operations ranging from sawmills
to fruit canning and juice operations had all been run-
ning at a loss and thus were placed in the debit column by
the economists evaluating them in cost–benefit terms. To
Guineans, they had been sources of personal and national
pride, to say nothing of employment.
The pace of transformation accelerated sharply, partly
thanks to Charles Taylor, whose Christmas Eve 1989 in-
vasion of Liberia caused refugees to enter Guinea from
early 1990 on in large numbers. Guinea had closely pa-
trolled its borders for decades, but it was about to re-
ceive an influx of refugees that many Guineans experienced
as a cultural onslaught. For the entirety of the 1990s, the
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number of Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees living in
Guinea ranged from about 300 thousand to 600 thousand
(McGovern 2002). I was living in the forest region of Guinea
at the time (adjacent to both Liberia and Sierra Leone), and
to my surprise, I found that Liberians who were of the same
ethnic groups as their Guinean hosts were quite different in
outlook, temperament, and style. National culture really did
matter, it seemed.
In the eyes of many Guineans, Liberians were loud,
brash, and “shameless.”8 Many Liberians considered
Guineans to be conservative, timid, and not very hard work-
ing. Under Guinea’s socialist government, entrepreneurial
initiative had brought only unwanted scrutiny from the
state, along with the possibility that one could be ac-
cused of being an enemy of the revolution. Liberians,
by contrast, partook of the vibrant culture of capitalism
that characterized most of the rest of West Africa. Within
months, Liberians who had arrived in Guinea with only
the clothes they were wearing had established restaurants,
bars, haircutting salons, and other small businesses as
many Guineans looked on amazed, sometimes envious and
other times appalled.9 This cultural rift around pathways to
self-enrichment served as grist for continuous commentary
by both Guineans and Liberians I knew about the charac-
teristics of each group and the moral implications of its
respective predilections.
Loma classification of historical periods
Periodization of the past, though essential in any effort
to understand historical change, also exerts a subtle in-
fluence on the analysis itself, allowing and encouraging
certain insights, obscuring others.
— Charles R. Hale, Resistance and Contradiction
The rapid changes in Guinean society and economy thus
had multiple causes, and they presented Guineans with a
menu of seemingly new choices that people often glossed in
French as “la liberte´” or “la de´mocratie.” However, as I did
life history interviews with a range of Loma-speaking peo-
ple in Macenta Pre´fecture, Guinea, in 1999 and 2000, I found
that many descriptions of social, political, and economic
change over the prior 120 years or so were more cyclical
than linear. Moreover, a large percentage of them were or-
ganized around the terms booyema and ziiεlei, which can be
rendered in European languages as “liberty” and “security”
but which derive from metaphorical talk about the body,
the person, and his or her morality and agency across time
and in society. The values attached to historical periods in
this cyclical model directly challenge the political narra-
tives of most Guinean intellectuals as well as most Africanist
scholars. Loma farmers suggested, first, that they had expe-
rienced the colonial period and the first 26 years of inde-
pendence, under the socialist government, as largely “the
same.” Second, they claimed that the contemporary post-
socialist period they were living through did not seem that
novel but, rather, resembled the late precolonial period in
many ways.
Many histories of Africa posit, either explicitly or im-
plicitly, a historical periodization of self-evidently distinct
precolonial, colonial, and independent periods. In this
section, I present material from conversations with Loma-
speaking rice farmers who subscribed to a different concep-
tion of historicity. The Loma term for history is woˆloˆwoˆloˆgi
(lit. “the old old [things]”).10 In discussing the past, ordi-
nary Loma speakers were still familiar with the historical
narrative of the socialist period, which fostered a rhetoric
of “one tribe, one resistance hero”11 as well as a tripartite
precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periodization. How-
ever, they evaluated the states that had claimed authority
over them according to different criteria from those used
in the nationalist historiography, often comparing different
regimes on the basis of the degree of booyema, or individual
liberty, that was available to actors at varying periods.
By their estimation, the colonial and socialist periods
were quite similar, both periods suppressing booyema and
assuring ziiεlei (security). Conversely, the (late) precolonial
period was comparable to the state under General Lansana
Conte´, in that rampant, often violent, entrepreneurial activ-
ity occurred at the expense of individuals’ security during
both eras.12 Although the terms booyema and ziiεlei charac-
terized people’s descriptions of the colonial and precolonial
periods, they may not have been terms in use during those
times. Given the near-absence of texts in Lomagui (Loma
language) from before 1930, it is difficult to reconstruct the
subaltern discourse of that earlier period. It is worth not-
ing, however, that in no case were these terms offered as
explicit explanatory or evaluative frames for understanding
historical experience. Rather, they consistently occurred in
accounts by men and women, younger and older farmers,
as terms describing a situation or disposition at one point
in a person’s life history.
At the same time that farmers consistently described
this version of the lives they, their parents, and their
children had lived, midlevel functionaries living among
them gave a different version of Guinean history. These
functionaries, including the Loma speakers among them,
accepted the periodization of nationalist historiography,
seeing three distinct periods characterized, respectively, by
precolonial autonomy and harmony; colonial oppression
and alienation; and heroic, if only partial, postcolonial
recovery from colonization’s depredations.
In over 100 such interviews with men and women in
Macenta Pre´fecture, as well as in many casual conversa-
tions, I discussed the different historical periods my in-
terlocutors had lived through or heard about from their
parents.13 At the end of most interviews, I asked the speaker
to rank the four historical periods—precolonial, colonial,
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socialist, and contemporary from best to worst. With almost
no exceptions, people identified the contemporary Conte´
period (1984 to the time of the research) as the best and the
socialist Toure´ period (1958–84) as the worst. Roughly half
rated the precolonial period as better than the colonial pe-
riod, and about half the other way around. These ratings are
not very interesting in themselves and might have been in-
fluenced by any number of factors. Wary of outsiders and
the state, Loma farmers generally praised the government
in power, so it was not surprising that most of my interlocu-
tors said the government of the day was the best.
What was interesting was how people explained their
choices when I asked them the reasons for their rankings.
These responses were interesting in themselves and be-
cause they were remarkably consistent. The Se´kou Toure´
period, most people said, was a time of suffering primarily
because the government had taken away their agricultural
products through the system ofnormes14 and because it had
banned the foreˆt sacre´e15 and all activities pertaining to it.
People had lost control over their own lives, their choices
about which activities to pursue, when, and how. The Conte´
government was hailed largely as having reversed these two
onerous policies as well as having built a road through the
forest region along with new schools and health centers.
Evaluations of other periods were more mixed. The
shift from precolonial independence to colonial conquest
and occupation was most often described as an ambiva-
lent transition, as was the shift from colonial governance
to postcolonial independence. Having already worked in
Guinea for some three years before starting my interviews,
I had clear expectations of what people would tell me: Most
Guineans are proud and intensely defiant of colonial and
neocolonial domination. I expected their accounts to hew
rather closely to the triumphal narratives promulgated by
the state and reproduced in some histories of Guinea’s inde-
pendence (Schmidt 2005). If Guineans generally hated colo-
nial rule, my experience during fieldwork had taught me
that Loma speakers also resented domination by their own
local leaders or senior family members within the lineage
hierarchy. As Marshall Sahlins wrote tongue in cheek about
the oxymoron of chiefs in egalitarian societies, “One word
from him and everyone does as he pleases” (1968:21). So it
was in the Guinean Loma-speaking villages I knew.
In this context, I expected the colonial period to be per-
ceived as an unmitigated disaster and the independent pe-
riod as a vast improvement. Not so. As one elder put it,
From my point of view, the colonial period was a time
of suffering only. We had forced labor for the chefs de
cantons,we had to build the Quinadou plantation com-
plex, we had to build buildings. In the Se´kou Toure´
time, we were excited at first. Se´kou said, “Let’s chase
these whites out of here,” and we agreed. But instead,
the government took away everything we had.16
Like many other Loma farmers I spoke with, this man saw
both the French and Se´kou Toure´ as the architects of poli-
cies that stripped them of their “booyema.”
Booyema and the history of individual striving
The concept of booyema is not easily translated. Loma
people who speak French typically render it as “liberte´,”
which almost translates to the English “liberty.” The French
places more emphasis on personal freedom to pursue one’s
own projects, what we might call “room to move” in En-
glish. In Lomagui, the term literally means “own-hand-on”
(boo-ye-ma).17 The term is thus part of a wider complex
of Loma notions about capacity, force, and the body that
elucidate Loma speakers’ conceptions of personhood and
morality.
While Loma conceptions of the emotions tend to relate
to terms about the heart (zi) or belly (koˆoˆ), notions of ca-
pacity refer to the hand or arm (ze). Those terms that indi-
cate the use or potential use of force all invoke the hand.
Zemaba, or “force,” means literally “to put the hand on”
(ze-ma-ba). Zelevhebai is most closely translated by “dom-
inance” yet literally means “his hand is more than mine”
(ze-levhe-bai).18 To return to the term booyema, the literal
“own hand on” is an extended metaphor about indepen-
dence and self-sufficiency. Its general connotation is “to rely
on one’s own hand or arm” or “to live by the strength of
one’s own arm.” Although this would seem to point more to
responsibility or capacity than to freedom, Loma concep-
tions of liberty have everything to do with this sort of self-
sufficiency. In an argument, a Loma speaker often says to an
adversary, “Are you the one who feeds me?” The question, as
rhetorical in Lomagui as in English, means that the person
who feeds himself is not beholden to anyone else. Thus, the
capacity granted by the strength of one’s arm is the measure
of one’s freedom from reliance on, or answerability to, any-
one else.
This linguistic context underlines what is obvious to
anyone who has lived in a Loma-speaking village. Freedom,
in the Loma conception, is, first and foremost, freedom
to and only secondarily freedom from.19 Although a large
proportion of Loma agricultural work is and must be done
collectively, Loma-speaking farmers hold tenaciously to the
inalienable right to work for themselves. “Today,” men and
women sometimes told me, describing the present era in
contrast to the socialist period, “If I want to stay in bed, I
can. If I want to go out to work at my field early, I can do that
too. If I work hard, the yield is mine. If I don’t want to work,
that’s my business.” It would be inconceivable for most
Loma farmers to laze about in bed all day, except in cases
of serious illness or extreme old age. But the point is more
than rhetorical. Loma speakers (both men and women)
regularly insist that their freedom to work hard or not,
participate in collective projects or not, be acknowledged
as a prerequisite to any further steps toward “productive”
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activity. It is in the presence or absence of such recognition
that Loma farmers have consistently interpreted their own
interactions with the series of states that have claimed
legitimate rule over their territory.
While capacity is figured in terms of the hand, many
emotions in Lomagui are expressed as different disposi-
tions of the heart. Ziiεlei is one term meaning “happiness”
or “calmness.”20 Literally, it means “heart-cool” (zii-lei).21
The term also means “contentment,” “peace,” or “security.”
It is this range of connotation that hints at the intersections
of Loma notions of individual and collective freedoms
and their shifting balance over time. Given a long history
of insecurity and intervillage warfare (see Holsoe 1977;
McGovern 2011, 2012), freedom from is, above all, freedom
from physical harm. The term helps us to see that in Loma
accounts of history, ziiεlei and booyema stand as two
variables in a zero-sum equation. The relative absence of
individually profitable booyema helps to ensure ziiεlei for
most of the society, while exaggerated booyema could be
(and is) enormously profitable for a few but comes at the
expense of the ziiεlei of the majority.
As Rosalind Shaw (1997, 2002) has described for Sierra
Leone, the power that was the source of protection for one
group was the source of death and destruction for its weaker
neighbors. Today there are many village sites in the Loma
forest region that are no longer inhabited. Sometimes, vil-
lagers moved during the colonial period or during the Toure´
years to be closer to a road or a market town. More often,
elders tell the story of villages attacked and razed to the
ground. Of women taken as captive wives and men either
killed or taken as captives and sold away from their home
regions, beyond the limits where their geographical and lin-
guistic knowledge might help them to escape (cf. Ferme
2001:40–48).
Consequently, there is in the Loma-speaking area,
as in the Temne-speaking area where Shaw has worked,
a counterdiscourse to the celebration of strong military
leaders. It is the narrative of illegitimate enrichment.
The story of chiefs and war chiefs whose good fortune
and wealth were built on others’ death and suffering. As
Shaw reminds us, “We sometimes forget that many of the
processes which constitute forms of ‘modernity’ are, in
perhaps most regions of the world, several centuries old”
(1997:857). Consequently, the linking of wealth, witchcraft,
and “modernity” found in many parts of Africa is both
a sophisticated critique of the creation of surplus value,
often through the objectification of human bodies and
work (Ashforth 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 1999a,
1999b, 2000) and a commentary on the moral economy
of booyema, or liberty, versus the security of ziiεlei. This
leads us back to the historiographic questions I raise
above.
Periodization as critique
Much Africanist historiography accepts a tripartite pe-
riodization of national histories—precolonial, colonial,
and postcolonial. Around 2000, Loma-speaking farmers
talked about four periods: late precolonial, colonial, Se´kou
Toure´’s socialist state, and Lansana Conte´’s laissez-faire
state.22
When I asked them to explicate their descriptions of the
past, the term booyema emerged again and again. No matter
where they began, people often ended up with the following
characterizations: In the late precolonial period, people’s
lives were dominated by intervillage slave raiding. There
was a lot of booyema, allowing the audacious and skilled
to become powerful and rich. For most people, the result
was extreme insecurity, or lack of ziiεlei. Rice farms had to
be planted close to the village, otherwise those who tended
them could be abducted in the bush. Villages needed strong
siγigiti (rampart walls) to protect them against attack. Many
people were killed or taken as captives.
In the colonial period, the French came and took away
Loma speakers’ political autonomy. Forced labor and po-
litical overlordship revoked people’s booyema and turned
them into vassals. At the same time, the end of the raiding
wars gave people greater personal security, or ziiεlei.
During the Toure´ period, the state revoked even more
of people’s booyema, as it outlawed ritual practices, pillaged
agricultural products, and forced people to perform theatri-
cal and other manifestations for visiting state dignitaries.
However, there was even more ziiεlei than in the colonial
period. There was virtually no crime, and no regional wars
spilled into the country.
Finally, in the Conte´ period, people regained their
booyema. They could work or not work. What they earned
was theirs; those with ambition and vision might become
rich and powerful. Yet, just as in late precolonial times,
people had watched their ziiεlei slip away. Theft, murder,
even rape, previously almost unheard of, had touched many
people’s lives. Each person sought her or his own benefit,
without consideration of others. The police sought only to
enrich themselves, so thieves paid them off and went free.
Anyone could get away with murder, people said, so long
as that person had the money to pay his or her way out of
jail.23
One woman described this phenomenon by compar-
ing the restrictions of the Toure´ period to those imposed by
parents. “It’s like when your parents are very strict, and keep
you always locked inside the house. Then one day your fa-
ther goes away and you say, ‘yes, I’m going out; I’m going
to stay out as long as I want and do anything!’ It was like
that in Guinea after Se´kou died” (K. H., March 20, 2000).
It is significant that all the interviews I discuss took place
before the regional war intruded into Guinea in September
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2000. These commentaries were made in the context of the
ten years of fighting that had taken place just over the bor-
der and had filled Guinean villages with refugees. Yet they
focused on Guinean internal politics and security. The war
that later destabilized Guinea (in 2000–01) only underlined
my interlocutors’ analysis.
That regional war was complex in the details of its
shifting alliances but quite simple in its structure. It had an
internal logic that most elders in Guinea’s forest region rec-
ognized: It was the logic of warlord politics. Several authors
(Ellis 1999; Reno 1999; Richards 1996) have emphasized
that it was the product of a relatively simple equation: weak
states that had lost their legitimacy; strong warlords who
relied on mystical arts of war; and international actors
who waited, vulturelike, both to fuel the fighting with fresh
weapons, ammunition, and drugs and to reap the spoils of
pillage, in the form of hardwood, diamonds, and rubber.
Just as in the 19th century, this equation heralded the return
to exaggerated booyema and the disappearance of ziiεlei.
Refugees as avatars of a dangerous modernity
So far I have argued for a complex reading of history and
causality from the point of view of people who were repeat-
edly on the short end of the historical stick over the past
150 years. They were people who were always-already lib-
eral, inasmuch as they deeply valued their ability to work
where, when, and how they pleased, accepting a degree of
economic and social precarity in return for what they de-
fined as “liberty.” Moreover, their lived experience of ac-
tually existing socialism was not that of a Scandinavian
welfare state but of a strong and moralistic state that was
willing to punish and even kill its own citizens to impose its
view of proper social relations, a view that often cast some
of those citizens in the role of backward counterexamples
for the rest of the population.
By the same token, their sense of what defined “pre-
carity” was significantly more pointed than the one most
people entertain. It included the relatively recent mem-
ories of late precolonial slave raiding,24 with its killings,
abductions, and rapes. It also included colonial forced la-
bor, during which men were regularly worked to death and
women were preyed on sexually by colonial officers and
their African prote´ge´s. In the experiences of the refugees
they met and hosted in the 1990s, they saw the mayhem
caused by untrammeled booyema in the present, with many
killed, raped, and mutilated and many others turned into
chattel to serve as porters, child soldiers, and “bush wives”
(Coulter 2009). Their appreciation of ziiεlei was thus one in
which the stakes were high indeed.
Refugees as catalysts of debate and critique
But what of those refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone?
How were they seen, and where did they fit into Guineans’
own attempts to evaluate the broad transformations that
were going on in their society? The arrival of refugees was
one of several factors that impelled cultural and economic
transformations in Guinea in the 1990s. Liberian refugees,
unlike many Sierra Leonean refugees, mostly self-settled in
Guinean villages and towns rather than in separate refugee
camps (McGovern 1998). They arrived with different music,
different foods, different ways of dressing, and different
attitudes toward everything from commerce to sexuality.
For Guineans, they were both emblematic of and active
agents in the important shifts in the moral sphere of
Guinean life. In this regard, they became flashpoints for
Guinean discussions of the morality of choice. All of the
problems of agency, accountability, causality, and morality
that I have glossed as the morality of liberty, and that
are captured in the interplay between the Loma terms
booyema and ziiεlei, were embodied at the interpersonal
level by refugees. They were specifically made visible in
forms of bodily hexis that carried with them significa-
tions linking postures, practices, and comportments to
moral statuses.25 Styles of dress, sexual preferences, and
relations between spouses or lovers, food and defecation,
and even forms of commerce all opened out into moral
exegesis.
In January 2013, I met an old friend in N’Zerekore, the
capital of the forest region. Julianna, as I call her here, had
arrived in N’Zerekore in 1990 as a refugee from Liberia. She
was university educated and was working in a Liberian gov-
ernment ministry as a secretary when the war broke out.
She came originally from a village in Nimba County, directly
on the Guinean border, and fled into Guinea during the first
year of fighting. Twenty-three years later, she owned a hotel
and several other small businesses in Guinea and had never
gone back to Liberia. I asked her about those early years in
Guinea, and she began by saying,
We were spoon-fed in Liberia. We didn’t know hard-
ship. In fact, we were used to Guineans coming to
Liberia during the Se´kou Toure´ times looking for help.
They were traumatized. When we wanted to make fun
of one another, for instance, if someone did some-
thing awkward or dressed badly, we would say, “You
look like a Guinea Man, oh!” We looked down on them
and laughed about their strange ways. If a Guinea man
bought a new car in Liberia, he would scratch it, dent
it, make it look old before he crossed over [into Guinea]
so they would not take it away from him. So it was sur-
prising when those people who had come to us for help
suddenly became our hosts.26
The Guineans were more hospitable [than Ivorians].
But we did some things that seemed strange to
them . . . . Girls wore clothing above the knee, and they
would get arrested. Guinean men left their families for
Liberian women. Our ways of cooking were different.
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Guinean men tasted our food and they thought it was
tastier. We would play with our men. Sometimes we put
the food into their mouths. We would take baths with
them. When we had a lover, we would buy him new,
white underwear. We didn’t like the red, blue under-
wear they were wearing. The Guinean men went crazy
for playful love. Guinean women, they thought that you
had to be strong. They thought if you had children for
the man, he would come to love you. We had a different
way.27
While Julianna emphasized the differences between a
playful and an adversarial model of relations between men
and women, Guineans often describe Liberians through the
lens of a set of embodied comportments. Each of these
commentaries is morally evaluative and often accompa-
nied by a rueful acknowledgment that younger genera-
tions and the world in general seem to be following a
“Liberian” path rather than a “Guinean” one. Some key ar-
eas of evaluation are dress, sexual relations, excrement, and
commerce.
Dress. One of the aspects of Liberian comportment
Guineans commented on most was dress. Men wore shorts
for activities other than sport and agricultural labor. Women
wore trousers and shorts as everyday attire. Guineans of-
ten criticized the Liberian style as being both sloppy and
disrespectful. Although the majority of Guineans in the re-
gion that received the refugees were not Muslim, Guinea as
a country is 85–90 percent Muslim, and, within national cul-
ture, notions of respectability were largely based on Mus-
lim West African norms, which included the necessity of
covering the legs (especially the thighs) and of wearing
clothes that were relatively loose. I have described how
young Guineans were given the task of policing their com-
patriots’ dress during the years of the revolution. Liberian
refugees in Guinean towns especially were characterized
as dressing in an unacceptable manner, and, at the same
time, Guinean youths with no personal experience of the
revolutionary years began to dress more and more in the
“Liberian” style of jeans, T-shirts, and, for young women,
tighter and sometimes shorter skirts or trousers. Although
these sartorial shifts among Guineans had at least as much
to do with the opening of the economy and society, com-
mentary on them was often aimed at the polluting influ-
ence of foreigners. Comments on refugees and the dis-
comfort of Guinean adults with the styles and practices of
their adolescent children were thus interlinked in complex
ways.
One Guinean friend explained to me the “problems”
caused by the new sexier dress worn by Conakry women,
its signification and sources. He put the “blame” squarely
on refugee women. As he put it, neither Sierra Leoneans
nor Liberians have a notion of differentiating evening from
daytime wear. In fact, he distinguished several different
categories of dress, including tenue du travail, what one
would wear to the office; veˆtements de nuit, which, for
women, legitimately includes sexy items like miniskirts
and skin-tight nylon dresses; around-the-house wear; and
habits d’invitation, like the majestic Grand Boubou out-
fits Guineans wear on major holidays. There is also Friday
wear, the rough equivalent for Guinean Muslims of U.S.
Christians’ “Sunday best” clothes.
In his view, refugee women lacked a sense of these
distinctions and, he implied, a respect for their hosts’ cul-
ture that would have led them to refrain from wearing sexy
clothes “n’importe ou` et n’importe comment” (anywhere
and anyhow). For him, wearing trousers was really not ac-
ceptable for a woman, and he talked about “not letting any
sister of mine go out of the house dressed that way.” He
said that people consider women who wear tight or short
dresses to be of loose morals, although he gave an extended
example of how looks could mislead. His cousin’s girlfriend
wore only trousers, shorts, and short skirts yet was excep-
tionally chaste and correcte. So, he admitted, looks could be
deceiving. I asked him what he thought her reasons were for
dressing as she did, and he said it was probably a desire to
be modern, to be chic and sophisticated.28 In this area, as
in others, Guineans recognized that refugees were “in sync”
with global styles and practices, and they consequently
understood the pull these styles could exert on Guinean
youth. They nevertheless remained critical of them. Liberi-
ans, my friend and other Guineans suggested, took the
liberties of modern dress codes to extremes, in effect,
abusing them.
Sexuality and gender relations. This was another area
in which Liberians were judged to be not only morally sus-
pect but also an actively polluting influence in Guinean
society. Guinean men and women agreed that Liberian
refugee women were more solicitous of their husbands than
Guinean women were. “The Liberians are better at making
their husbands happy,” one male friend told me. “They al-
ways bring you hot water to bathe every morning, and cook
plenty of rice and sauce for you in the evening.” My fe-
male Guinean research colleague complained that this was
an unfair way of seeking advantage in the competition for
men’s favor and their money. “They do all kinds of things
for their husbands—they heat water for them, they’ll do
all kinds of things sexually that Guinean women won’t do.”
Liberian women were willing to have sex on all fours, some-
thing no Guinean woman would accept. “They even do anal
sex,” she claimed.29
Her objection was less moralistic than that of some
other Guineans. For her, the Liberian women were break-
ing the unwritten rules of gender solidarity. Even if she
could understand that such “services” might be the only
way Liberian women could gain an advantage over local
women and thus survive in village settings, she resented
their sexual and domestic entrepreneurialism in the same
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way that striking union members would resent strikebreak-
ing scabs. This version squares with the vision of playful,
nonantagonistic love described by Julianna, the long-term
Liberian resident of Guinea.
A male acquaintance explicitly linked these new gen-
der relations to political-economic shifts and “democracy,”
which at that time was often used as an umbrella term for
describing all of the concurrent changes going on. He for-
warded the thesis that “Guinea has been spoiled by these
loose-moraled Liberian women.” He went on to detail the
lengths to which male civil servants “had to” go to steal
money so they could seduce and keep happy the irresistibly
dressed, coiffed, and perfumed Liberian women. Worse yet,
after ten years of observing the example of a free market of
love (which he metaphorized as “la democratie”), Guinean
women had taken up the same comportment. What were
the poor men to do?30
Excrement. Ato Kwame Onoma has also conducted re-
search in the forest region of Guinea as well as in Sierra
Leone and Liberia, collecting both former (Liberian and
Sierra Leonean) refugees’ and (Guinean) hosts’ recollec-
tions of the 1990s and of relations between the two groups.31
He has turned up a discourse entirely in line with many of
those I am describing here, though I have never heard it my-
self during my fieldwork. It involves a kind of symbolic, or
perhaps even a moral, economy of excrement. In the vil-
lages of Guinea’s forest region, where most people do not
have latrines, refugees were accused both of defecating in
the wrong places in the bush and of defecating “matter out
of place,” as a result of their putatively unnatural diet of bul-
gur wheat, hated by both refugees and their hosts but dis-
tributed as food rations to the refugees. As Onoma writes,
Refugees were generally blamed when feces was dis-
covered in places that were not supposed to be used as
places of convenience . . . . If they saw a refugee shitting
somewhere they did not always wait to reproach her.
They tried to stop her while she was in the act. “When
you went to the bush to shit if they saw you they gave
you no peace. They began to scream at you “Get up, get
up. Don’t shit there. That place is not for shitting.” If the
deed had already been done then the unlucky refugee
might be forced to remove it while enduring a few slaps.
The locals developed a rather sophisticated discourse
on fecal matters that focused on issues including soil
fertility and cultural survival, food quality and what one
might call after-shitting rituals. Refugee fecal matter
was portrayed as the ultimate threat to the survival of
these cultures that are in many ways defined by rice-
growing . . . The Guineans used to say “The refugees are
shitting undigested bulgur and it is going to destroy our
bushes and make the soil infertile. We are in big trouble.
We won’t be able to make rice farms anymore!” They
had explanations for the supposedly high toxicity of
refugee fecal matter. . . . Some of the youth would strut
in front of refugees saying “Bulgur does not digest. They
shit it everywhere the same way they eat it, destroying
our bushes.” . . . They took some time to poke fun at the
destitution of the refugees. “When the refugees shit it is
pale because they eat their food with no ingredients.”
“The fecal matter of the refugees is white because they
eat palm kernel oil. Ours is red because we eat palm
oil.” [2013:121–122]
Onoma notes, “The local discourse on fecal matters
shows the level of imagination that locals deployed to slan-
der and tease the refugees” (2013:122). Yet this discourse
is not limited to refugee–host relations in this part of West
Africa. The digestive process is often given moral valence,
with ideas about transparency and morality captured by
Eric Gable in the Manjaco (Guinea Bissau) proverb “Eat
palm oil, shit red” (1995:251). In other words, given that the
seat of the emotions and also of the hidden sentiments of
resentment, envy, and aggression is in the internal organs,
the transparency implied by the notion of “what goes in
should come out” signifies good will, honesty, and respon-
sibility. The aberrant feces of the refugees were held against
them, even while Guineans acknowledged the source in
their impoverished diet.
Commerce. In some ways, the most striking difference
between Guineans and Liberians, and one that I noticed
immediately in early 1990, had to do with commercial ac-
tivity. Liberians who had just arrived with little more than
what they were wearing were suddenly involved in all kinds
of business ventures. People opened restaurants and ho-
tels, haircutting salons, and shops. These changes were, like
all the others, multicausal. N’Zerekore, the regional capital
where I was living and working as a math teacher from 1989
to 1991, went from being a sleepy town of 50,000 with only
a dozen European residents and not many more African
expatriates to a town of over 100,000, filled with refugees,
international NGOs, and the nerve center of a major hu-
manitarian intervention. Guineans came from all over the
country to take up jobs, and European and African expatri-
ates also arrived in droves. The market for toilet paper, for
chocolate, for cold beer, and for restaurant food blossomed
overnight and continued to grow for most of the 1990s.
Given this growth, one must consider why so much of
this market was cornered by refugees and not Guineans.
Moreover, the large majority of the small businesses in
N’Zerekore sprouted before there were programmatic ef-
forts to give refugees small loans. At first, Guineans looked
on with disbelief and a fair amount of distaste. Until 1984,
the state promised all Guineans who graduated from high
school or university jobs for life. Guineans intuited that par-
ticipation in the private and informal sectors was ultimately
inimical to the continuation of that system.
Over time, many Guineans became increasingly en-
trepreneurial themselves. Though expressed in a different
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idiom, surviving the austere socialist years had required
many different forms of entrepreneurial activity, from the
informal economy of favors that lubricated the unwieldy
bureaucratic machine to the work of smuggling agricultural
and other goods over borders to realize a profit. Other forms
of economic activity were judged as unambiguously im-
moral and unacceptable. These included prostitution and
dealing in drugs. Both activities were perceived by many
Guineans as having been introduced by refugees in the
1990s, even though part of adults’ alarm stemmed from the
alacrity with which some of their children adopted these
same illicit commercial practices.
“Mon tre´sor” and “C’est l‘an 2000”
Guinean women in particular expressed a range of anxieties
about their daughters’ behavior. Some parents complained
that young people hardly married any more. Girls came
home pregnant and not sure who the father was, or, when
they identified the father, he denied responsibility, naming
the girl’s other lovers. One mother recounted that when a
young woman in her neighborhood was discovered engag-
ing in transactional sex, the elder women forbade her from
continuing to do so any more. She responded, pointing be-
tween her legs, “C’est mon tre´sor [This is my treasure] . . .
You can’t tell me what to do with it.”32 Several mothers de-
scribed insisting that their children be home by a given hour
or not loiter outdoors when films were being shown in the
town, and being met with the statement: “C’est l’an 2000!”
[This is the year 2000!], an all-purpose claim that young peo-
ple had thrown off the yoke of parental oversight. Here, the
use of a phrase in French inserted into a conversation oth-
erwise taking place in Lomagui was a further act of teenage
defiance, children distancing themselves from parents who
either had not attended school or had been instructed in the
national-language primary school curriculum of the social-
ist period.33
Africanist anthropologists have often approached the
ambivalences and destructiveness of fast capitalism with
an implicitly epidemiological model of understanding, as
if consumer desire infected those who came into contact
with it, like a microbe. Such a model takes Euro-American
folk theories about the ways that advertising and marketing
work on consumers’ imaginations (Horkheimer and Adorno
2001), making them desire against their wills, and combines
it with a reassuring insistence on the purity of the imagina-
tive lives of the people with whom we do research.
Many of the adults I spoke with, and particularly the
adult women, took a different view. They defined their chil-
dren, and especially their daughters, as agents whose strong
desires and fantasies could wreak havoc in their communi-
ties and needed to be domesticated. As Chris Coulter (2009)
notes, there is a continuity between these kinds of gendered
anxieties and long-standing ontological understandings
of gender in the region that came to include southeast-
ern Guinea and Sierra Leone. In this region, women are
not conceived of as being born nurturers but, rather, as
having natural inclinations to antisocial aggression. That
conception of innate aggression is part of why the con-
cept of “girl soldiers” was not so surprising to many West
Africans who lived through the Liberian and Sierra Leonean
wars and is also part of the stated raison d’eˆtre of the
women’s Sande and Bundu societies, whose socialization is
meant to bring such antisocial forces under control.
In the version of this dynamic made possible by
Guinea’s socioeconomic transformations in the 1990s, the
desire to have things drove some young people to renounce
the austere ethos of the socialist period. Under condi-
tions of heightened booyema, young people saw things and
wanted them. As undercapitalized entrepreneurs, they used
alternate forms of capital—strength, beauty, willingness to
take on risk—to leverage their dreams into realities (cf. Cole
2004, 2010; Monga 2000; Nyamnjoh 2005). In this regard,
the work of social ambition enacted by girls who casually
or occasionally capitalized on their sexuality was an affront
to the gerontocratic patriarchy that underlay the “domestic
mode of production” in exactly the same ways and accord-
ing to the same logic that fueled the generational rebellion
represented by young men turning against their elders and
becoming rebel fighters in the bush.
It was the same wars waged by these young people that
sent refugees fleeing into Guinea throughout the decade of
the 1990s. One gloss on the discussions of refugee comport-
ment and morality sketched above might be that Guineans
treated refugees as scapegoats and objects of abuse as they
themselves struggled to manage the shifts of the new ne-
oliberal dispensation. This view is partly accurate, and the
Guinean government did orchestrate attacks on refugees as
part of an effort to distract the population away from its own
unsavory activities.34 However, I think one must also em-
phasize the ways that refugees crystallized a set of conun-
drums already facing Guineans at that time. To paraphrase
Claude Le´vi-Strauss, refugees were “good to think” through
the problems of booyema and ziiεlei. Guinean Loma speak-
ers had regained the free disposition of their own bod-
ies and energies, something that the hated colonial and
socialist governments had revoked. Yet the perception of
refugees’ excesses reminded them of the dangers of unbri-
dled booyema and raised the question of how one should
dispose of these newly liberated potentialities.
Here we see that even if the socialist period had been
rejected in certain respects by Loma-speaking farmers, it re-
mained a significant source of their thinking about accept-
able forms of sociality. Se´kou Toure´ had claimed enormous
range in the parts of people’s lives the socialist state should
oversee—it aimed to control the ways people dressed, ate,
drank, married, and educated their children. It arrogated
responsibilities to its representatives to surveil citizens’
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hairstyles, hemlines, economic transactions, and even the
virginity of female students. The socialist state owned every
centimeter of Guinean soil but allowed those citizens who
were putting the soil “to good use” to acquire temporary de
facto ownership of portions of that land. In many respects,
it applied a comparable logic of temporary and provisional
mise en valeur ownership to the bodies of its citizens. The
public lynchings of petty criminals, shaming and impris-
onment of prostitutes, and torture and killing of accused
traitors to the state were all examples of the lengths to which
representatives of the state were willing to go to impose the
socialist moral order on their compatriots.
Liberian refugees arrived at the same time that the
Guinean government was starting to allow printed media to
operate that were not owned by the state, that satellite tele-
vision was beginning to bring in programming other than
the state’s single station (which no Guinean took seriously
as a source of anything but the government’s praise of it-
self), and that markets began to display goods from neigh-
boring countries, China, and Europe.
Why focus on the fact that Liberians wore shorts, on
their supposed willingness to engage in transgressive but
exciting sexual practices, or on the color of their feces? I
argue that these bodily indexes of a certain moral posture
toward the world drew attention not as the atavistic work-
ings of xenophobia or misogynistic shame but as forms of
commentary on shorts and sex and hair extensions, all of
which stood as indexes of potentially dangerous new forms
of freedom. That it was particularly middle-aged women
who articulated ambivalence about their daughters’ self-
objectification indicated to me that there is much to be
gained by looking through the same lens at changing forms
of gender, sexuality, and conjugality and the making and
managing of insurgency warfare or refugee flight. This point
concurs with much of the recent work on gender and war-
fare in Africa (e.g., Coulter 2009; Utas 2005).
Historical periodization and moral evaluation
When people talk about contemporary sexuality and
crime, they consistently come back to the negative
side of liberty. Often, they say, the young are no longer
afraid: of the state, of their parents, of the whip (this
was what two women said yesterday).
—Field notes, June 28, 2000
The periodization of history and the moral evaluation of
refugees’ behavior in postsocialist Guinea raise a number
of questions of interest to anthropologists working else-
where. First, what does it mean to have been an African
socialist nation? Is it theoretically significant that places like
Guinea, Ethiopia, and Tanzania were African when compar-
ing them to other socialist states? Or that they were socialist
in comparison to other African states?35 Guinea in the 1990s
was a hybrid that resulted from the postsocialist introduc-
tion of laissez-faire policies into a society exhausted but also
shaped by strong and intrusive governance.
Perhaps more significant still is the question of what
constitutes the moral calculus people in particular soci-
eties apply to evaluate others’ acts. Both the explication
of booyema and ziiεlei and Guineans’ talk about refugees
give us the materials for understanding one such calcu-
lus. The zero-sum equation implied by the interaction of
booyema and ziiεlei suggests several findings. First, while
a great deal of scholarly attention has been focused on the
period of structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms, we
might do well to place these shifts within a longer histor-
ical framework. The history of Africa’s relations with the
world system from the late 15th century has been one of in-
equality and dispossession quite well captured by the Loma
term booyema. Loma speakers’ use of the term, moreover,
made explicit comparisons between the period of 19th-
century intervillage slave raiding and the fast capitalism of
the 1990s.
Giving booyema and ziiεlei all the attention I argue
they deserve also implies an epistemological shift. In this
article, I have made a case that anthropologists might
profitably look to our fieldwork materials both for empir-
ical material and for the categories that most profitably
organize its analysis. Difference in categories is one of
degree, not kind. Loma speakers, like other West Africans,
have been part of the capitalist modern world for as long as
Europeans have, and in viewing them as cocreators of that
world (even if subaltern and economically marginalized
ones), I see nothing to suggest “ontological” differences
between poor Guinean farmers and anyone else. Neither
is this a plea to return to an older intellectualist tradition
that sometimes fetishized concepts like hau or mangu but,
rather, to treat poor people’s categories of understanding
the world as the products of organic intellectual conver-
sation and evaluation that they are. We are not obliged to
accept these categories at face value, and, in this case, none
of my interlocutors offered booyema and ziiεlei as a grid
for understanding historical change; I constructed that grid
after poring over my transcriptions for months. However,
terms like booyema and ziiεlei have another advantage,
inasmuch as they throw both academics’ and Guinean
intellectuals’ categories of understanding into relief. That
contrast suggests that the vocabulary of European and
North American–based Africanist scholars and that of
African intellectuals and civil servants based in capital
cities and in towns overlap considerably.
To the extent that this shared language is opposi-
tional to the powerful institutions of business, politics,
and the development industry, we may allow ourselves to
forget that it still remains foreign to the vast majority of
poor rural people. This is not a matter of poor people
lacking the education to understand the reality of their
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situation. Many Guinean farmers are perfectly versed in the
Marxist and pan-Africanist narrative articulated by the state
during the 26-year socialist period. They simply choose to
reject much of this narrative, which typically construed
them as backward and in need of some form of remaking.36
At the same time, they reserved the right to also reject the
capitalist dreamworld of untrammeled choice offered as
an alternative.
The forms of intellectual collusion that take place be-
tween anthropologists and intellectuals in the places where
we work may operate primarily as an effective means of
managing our own anxieties (Kulick 2006) and giving voice
to our critiques of our home societies, wherever they may be
(Marcus and Fischer 1986). This moment in our analytical
dialectic can be enlightening, but it can also occlude lines of
approach that would be equally or more apt to the ideas and
experiences we aim to understand. The distinction between
booyema and ziiεlei that figures in Loma farmers’ accounts
of historical change rubs uncomfortably against both con-
servative and radical historiographies created by elites pre-
cisely because of the ways it quietly implicates us (i.e., all
elites) as the authors of consistent if ever-changing forms of
suffering for those living on the margins of the global capi-
talist system.
Part of Guinean Loma speakers’ discomfort with their
children and with refugees in the late 1990s stemmed from
their acute sense that both were groups of people whose
desires had outstripped their means. This was a zone they
knew well from the past, a zone where the scale tipped to-
ward the greed-fueled violence of booyema, where some
benefited at the expense of the lives and the security of oth-
ers. Guineans were acutely aware of the systemic aspects of
the international political economy that facilitated the self-
enrichment of warlords such as Charles Taylor. At the same
time, they remained focused most of the time on correcting
and policing the bodily comportments, sexuality, and com-
mercial ventures of their children and the strangers they
hosted, even while they were fascinated by many of the nov-
elties these entrepreneurial actors introduced. In this insis-
tence, sometimes articulated through a language of socialist
nostalgia, sometimes through religious zeal, and sometimes
through simple “tough love” parenting, Loma speakers at-
tempted to shape the situations around them.
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1. Odile Goerg (2011) has recently given an incisive historical
analysis of the notion of Guinea’s four “natural” regions and the
ecological, political, and cultural characteristics that are attached
to them. This form of stereotyped knowledge had roots in the colo-
nial production of knowledge about Guinea but has been actively
reproduced by the postcolonial Guinean education system and in
public discourse.
2. Liisa Malkki (1995a, 1995b) discusses the many ways refugees
are transformed into almost empty signs to be filled with the inten-
tions and instrumentality of others.
3. Among the reforms insisted on by international financial in-
stitutions were the closing of most of Guinea’s small manufacturing
plants (e.g., for canning fruits, making fruit juice, making plywood),
radical downsizing of the civil service, and the abandonment of the
long-standing socialist-era promise that all high school and univer-
sity graduates would have jobs for life. Utilities, including water and
electricity, were privatized during this period. Guinea was under
considerable pressure to let the value of its currency float in rela-
tion to other world currencies and to open its banking system to
foreign banks. Although separate from these reforms, the introduc-
tion of multiparty elections and of a private (written) press came a
few years after the economic reforms of the mid-1980s to the early
1990s.
4. Because of this simultaneity, they sometimes affected one an-
other synergistically, sometimes at cross-purposes.
5. The state set artificially low prices for all agricultural goods,
so farmers could earn far more by selling their produce across the
border. Because the economic policies (enforced by a cadre of eco-
nomic police) set prices near or below producers’ costs and pre-
vented most people most of the time from exfiltrating their goods
over the borders, many Guinean farmers simply ceased producing
crops for sale and concentrated on subsistence.
6. This was true in schools even as late as 1989–91 (five to seven
years after the end of the socialist period).
7. Conte´ described himself in implicit contrast to Se´kou Toure´, “I
am not a man for dialogue. I am a soldier. I receive orders; I execute
them. Or I give orders, and others execute them” (Le Lynx 2001).
8. This critique may also have applied to some Guineans who
had been resident for many years in Liberia, but, for the most
part, Loma, Kissi, and Kpelle people who migrated from Guinea to
Liberia either did so for a short period or engaged in a years-long
dance of back-and-forth trips across the border.
9. Partly because of economic liberalization and partly because
of the example set by Liberians, many Guineans gradually became
more involved in private commerce themselves.
10. See also Kratz 1993 on tradition and the objectification of the
past.
11. According to this formula, each ethnic group had a represen-
tative figure who fought the onset of French colonial control. This
figure was frequently portrayed in Guinean theater and dance per-
formances and was taught to schoolchildren across the country. For
Loma speakers, this figure was N’Zebela Togba Pivi.
12. This analysis directly parallels, and in many respects is
the source of, the two ideal types of sociopolitical action that I
have put forward elsewhere: “Gerontocratic Hierarchy” and “En-
trepreneurial Capture” (McGovern 2011).
13. Most of those I formally interviewed ranged in age from 40
to 90. My conversations with younger people were usually unstruc-
tured.
14. Normes were the in-kind taxes extracted in the form of rice,
coffee beans, cooking oil, and other agricultural produce.
15. The foreˆt sacre´ was the “sacred forest” in which initiations
into the men’s and women’s societies took place as well as a term
that indexed all of the activities that took place there.
16. The Quinadou plantation and adjoining production facility
was the main source of quinine pills in the French West African
258
Liberty and moral ambivalence  American Ethnologist
colonies and continued producing quinine during the socialist pe-
riod. After the complex, like other state-owned enterprises, was
closed shortly after the end of socialism, Guinean entrepreneurs
made several unsuccessful attempts to restart its operations. The
plantation is located in the beautiful Ziama mountains, and one
house at its edge was offered to Kwame Nkrumah when he was de-
posed as Ghana’s president and welcomed to Guinea as its hon-
orary copresident.
17. The Loma term for hand or arm, ze changes to ye when pre-
ceded by a strongly accented word. On initial consonant change,
see Bangoura 1978.
18. I thank my colleague Jacques Onivogui for helping me un-
derstand these interlinked terms.
19. The distinction is similar to Isaiah Berlin’s between posi-
tive and negative liberty, as developed in his 1958 lecture “Two
Concepts of Liberty” (Berlin 1969). While the actor’s point of view
among Loma-speaking farmers emphasizes the importance of pos-
itive liberty (freedom to), it is also dependent on a modicum of
negative liberty, for instance, from the demands of the intrusive
colonial or socialist state.
20. Another is koˆoˆzunεεve, literally, “sweetness in the belly.”
21. The opposite of ziiεlei is ziigbadiε, literally “hot heartedness”
but close to the sense of the English hotheadedness.
22. Loma speakers do not have a tradition of professional
historian–praise singers, like the jeliw in neighboring Maninka and
Bamana societies, and precolonial history tends to be shallow.
23. These narratives are as strong in small provincial towns as
they are in Conakry, where events like the antigang trials of 1995
brought some of the cooperation between the security forces and
bandits to light. The rash of murder–robberies of rich Conakry
merchants in 2000–01 evoked the same set of criticisms. Such
critiques of the state’s inability, or lack of interest in, protecting
its own citizens are even more pronounced in Sierra Leone and
Liberia. Throughout the war in Sierra Leone, members of the na-
tional army operated as “sobels,” or soldiers by day and rebels
by night. At the international level, systematic charges were lev-
eled at ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group) forces, and especially their dominant Nigerian
component, of purposely prolonging the war to enrich themselves
(Jetley 2000).
24. The last of these raids in the Loma-speaking area of what be-
came Guinea took place in 1906.
25. There is a vast Africanist literature on personhood and
morality (Bird and Kendall 1980; Fortes 1959; Jackson and Karp
1990; Kratz 1994) and one on strangers in African societies (Shack
and Skinner 1979). As do the chapters in Jackson and Karp 1990,
this essay brings the two together.
26. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the economic police
were charged with enforcing state-mandated prices in the mar-
kets but also with spotting anyone whose personal possessions
might indicate that he or she had amassed illicit wealth. Two
of the signs Guineans consistently identify as drawing the eco-
nomic police’s attention were corrugated zinc roofing in place
of thatch and, as Julianna makes clear, any kind of motorized
vehicle.
27. J. G., N’Zerekore, January 17, 2013.
28. Conakry, January 17, 2001.
29. Field notes, Pelema, May 15, 2000. These interviews were
conducted in 2000 in a midsized town that I call “Pelema” in my
published ethnography (McGovern 2013). Almost all of the re-
spondents were between 25 and 90 years old, with slightly more
women represented than men. About 90 percent of the interview-
ees made their livings primarily as farmers. At the time I began
these semistructured life history interviews, I had been conducting
participant-observer-oriented fieldwork for about 18 months. All
interviews were in Lomagui.
30. Field notes, March 19, 2000.
31. My sincere thanks to Kwame for discussing his book when it
was still a work in progress and for allowing me to reproduce several
passages from what was then still a manuscript.
32. Interview, Pelema, July 10, 2000.
33. These intergenerational arguments over the proper role and
deployment of female sexuality resemble those described by Lila
Abu-Lughod (1990) in the West Egyptian desert in the 1980s.
34. At the time of the 2000 antirefugee attacks, the govern-
ment was putting political opponent and present-day president Al-
pha Conde´ on trial for allegedly trying to destabilize the country
(McGovern 2002).
35. This issue has been discussed most systematically in Askew
and Pitcher 2006, but the discussion has only begun and merits
long-term debate and exchange.
36. The forms of what James C. Scott (1999) would call “author-
itarian high modernism” deployed by the colonial, socialist, and
postsocialist states against Guinean farmers and their agricultural
practices are elegantly documented by in Fairhead and Leach 1996.
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